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THE PROBLEM WITH RELYING ON PROFIT-DRIVEN MODELS TO PRODUCE
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Liza Vertinsky***

The longstanding problems of relying on a market response to a pandemic are becoming readily
apparent in the United States, which has quickly become the epicenter of the COVID-19 outbreak.
The problems are particularly pronounced in pharmaceutical markets, where we are pinning our
hopes for both cures and vaccines.1 In previous work we have shown how characteristics of
healthcare markets in the United States create a divergence between the private incentives of forprofit companies and public health needs, leading to sub-optimal health outcomes in what is a
uniquely market-driven healthcare system. 2 In this Essay, written as the COVID-19 pandemic
unfolds, we illustrate how this divergence of private incentives from public health needs widens
in contexts of pandemic preparedness and pandemic response. The Essay begins by explaining
why the design of pharmaceutical markets in the United States yields suboptimal and sometimes
even negative health outcomes. The Essay then follows the trajectory of the drug remdesivir as a
case study that illustrates the consequences of relying on profit-driven pharmaceutical research
and development (R&D) models for pandemic preparedness and response.3 We conclude that,
contrary to what many commentators suggest, government policy responses to pandemic threats
that rely primarily on increasing private market incentives within our existing pharmaceutical
markets are unlikely to yield pandemic treatments that meet public healthcare needs. 4 Policy
interventions should instead be designed in ways that narrow the divergence of private interests
from public health needs, especially in pandemic contexts. Achieving this will likely require
greater public-sector involvement in pharmaceutical R&D.5
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Comparative and International Law. S.J.D., LL.M., Duke Law School.
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1
See e.g., Ed Yong, How the Pandemic Will End, ATLANTIC (Mar. 25, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2020/03/how-will-coronavirus-end/608719/
2
See Yaniv Heled, Liza Vertinsky & Cass Brewer, Why Healthcare Companies Should Be(come)Benefit
Corporations, 60 B. C. L. REV. 73 (2019); Ana Santos Rutschman, The Vaccine Race in the 21st Century, 61 ARIZ.
L. REV. 729 (2019).
3
While we acknowledge that the response by the United States federal government has also been inadequate, this
does not make a strategy of relying on the market to drive response to a healthcare crisis a prudent one. Indeed,
perhaps the federal government response has been inadequate in part because of the heavy reliance that the current
administration has placed on the private sector, particularly large corporate actors, to meet public health needs.
4
See e.g., Editorial Board, Drug Innovation to the Rescue, WALL ST. J., May 1, 2020,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/drug-innovation-to-the-rescue-11588373344. Public healthcare needs in this context
relates to availability, accessibility, and timeliness of treatments.
5
While in other work we have explored the opportunities, and limits, of alternative hybrid strategies such as publicprivate partnerships, exploring hybrid ways of engaging in drug R&D in preparation for, and in response to,
pandemics is beyond the scope of this paper. See, however, Esha Chhabra, How This Pandemic Could Help Fix
Capitalism, FORBES, Apr. 30, 2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/eshachhabra/2020/04/30/how-this-pandemiccould-help-fix-capitalism/#389e65d2d56b (discussing changes to corporate norms in the wake of the COVID-19
pandemic).
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I.

Divergence of Profit-Based Incentives from Public Health Needs in United States
Pharmaceutical Markets

The United States is an outlier among developed economies in its reliance on the market to provide
healthcare products and services, albeit with substantial public financial support. If healthcare
markets functioned in the same way as the perfectly competitive markets of neoclassical
economics, this might be a good idea. In theory, in a market-based system, producers make
production and pricing decisions in response to (1) consumer demand and willingness to pay, (2)
their own costs of production, and (3) competition from other producers. In such a simple
neoclassical world, the outcome is an efficient one. Private companies compete on price and
quality of their goods and services in efforts to maximize profits. Profit reflects both supply costs
and consumer demand. Competition pushes prices down until supra-normal profits are eliminated
and goods are provided at prices that equate the cost of production and the marginal value of
consumption. In an efficient market, consumers have sufficient information about the comparative
benefits that a product or service will afford them; they can value those benefits; they have the
ability to rationally choose from a range of competing alternatives; they know what the price is,
and they elect to purchase the good or service when the value it provides to them exceeds the cost.
Competition among producers acts to reduce prices that diverge too much from underlying costs
of production. The result, in this ideal neoclassical world, is that consumers get the products they
want at a price that is reasonably tied to costs of production and reflective of consumer value.
But healthcare markets diverge in important ways from this competitive market ideal. 6 In earlier
work we have argued that healthcare markets have distinctive characteristics that produce suboptimal public health outcomes when products and services are developed and sold by entities
such as corporations that focus primarily on profit-maximization. 7 Using pharmaceutical markets
as the most salient example,8 we illustrated how the structure of United States healthcare markets
has resulted in a persistent divergence of private market incentives from public health needs at
every stage of the pharmaceutical product life cycle. This divergence too often leads to companies
maximizing profits at the expense of, rather than in pursuit of, public health value. We have argued
that this divergence of incentives arises from the combination of three important features of United
States healthcare markets.
First, in healthcare markets prices often fail to serve as a good indicator of either cost or public
health value. The entity or person who pays for the product is often different from the patientconsumer and from the entity or person who prescribes the product, the product is rarely viewed
as anything other than essential, payors (including patients themselves) often lack information
about the health value of the product for the patient, and the fragmentation of the market makes it
difficult to ascertain cost and price information. 9 The normal forces of supply and demand, with
price as the mediator, do not work well in this opaque and fragmented system, even with the

6

See e.g., Kenneth Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 141
(2004); Paul Krugman, Why Markets Can’t Cure Healthcare, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 25, 2009 (summarizing Arrow’s
seminal argument about why health care cannot be sold like other goods).
7
See Heled & Vertinsky supra note 2 at 76 n. 8 (defining healthcare companies).
8
We use the term “pharmaceutical markets” in this Essay to refer broadly to markets for pharmaceutical and
biopharmaceutical products, including drugs, vaccines, and drug-device combinations.
9
For further discussion of how price fails to reflect public health value see Why Healthcare Companies Should
Be(come)Benefit Corporations supra note 2, at 36-43.
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(contested) assumption that we can reasonably view patients as consumers, 10 leaving producers
with too much control over product choice and price.
Second, United States healthcare markets are characterized by the socialization of costs but
privatization of benefits, leaving producers with access to subsidies and guaranteed purchases
while allowing them control over what to produce and what to charge for it. This reflects both a
paradigm and a powerful political narrative of biomedical innovation that has driven United States
policymaking in this area since the end of World War II. 11 The basic scientific research and
discovery that feeds R&D is treated as a public good and subsidized as such by the government.
The private sector is tasked with taking the discoveries made by publicly funded efforts through
the later stages of R&D and turning them into products and services by navigating a lengthy and
costly regulatory approval process. For this risk and investment, pharmaceutical companies have
been granted exclusive rights to heavily publicly funded research and the right to commercialize
the resulting products on their own terms.12 The government is also a substantial purchaser of these
products, primarily through publicly funded insurance programs like Medicaid and Medicare, but
with limited ability to bargain over price. 13 Any attempts to implement price controls or cost
recoupment measures are challenged on the grounds that they will stifle innovation. 14
Finally, healthcare markets in the United States are characterized by extensive regulations and a
market structure that limits competition. This is especially true for pharmaceutical markets due to
(a) the increased use of exclusivities as incentives for innovation and data secrecy; (b) a high
regulatory burden; and (c) concentration in pharmaceutical product markets. The ability to obtain,
maintain, and expand exclusivity is a key driver of company decisions at every stage of the product
life cycle, beginning with selection of potential drug candidates to pursue and extending through
the development of the drug and its marketing and sale. Extensive regulatory capture, in which
healthcare companies influence policymakers and regulators in ways that serve their own special
interests, enhances the role of regulatory exclusivities as mechanisms for limiting competition and
enhancing profit opportunities, further widening the divergence of private incentives from the
public interest.15

10

See e.g., Paul Krugman, Patients are not Consumers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2011,
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/22/opinion/22krugman.html.
11
See e.g., Ron A. Bouchard & Trudo Lemmens, Privatizing Biomedical Research—A “Third Way,” 26 NATURE
BIOTECH. 31 (2008); Amy Kapczynski and Gregg Gonsalves, Alone Against the Virus, BOSTON REV., Mar. 19, 2020
(exploring the negative consequences of having a health system with a “laser-like focus on maximizing profit” in the
context of a pandemic).
12
There are several provisions embedded in current laws governing transfers of publicly funded technology that
subject these transfers to a regime designed to encourage the commercialization of drugs and other products at
affordable prices. See e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 209 (establishing both procedural and substantive requirements for the
licensure of publicly funded inventions); 28 U.S.C. § 1498. These legal frameworks, however, remain underutilized.
See Ana Santos Rutschman, Vaccine Licensure in the Public Interest: Lessons from the Development of the United
States Army Zika Vaccine, 127 YALE. L. J. F. 651 (2018) (explaining how several of these limitations are often
disregarded in practice by both the public and the private sectors, with specific reference to pharmaceutical products
for which there is little to no private-sector appetite prior to an outbreak of an infectious disease).
13
See e.g., Sarah Kliff, The True Story of America’s Sky-High Prescription Drug Prices, VOX, May 10, 2018.
14
See e.g., Wayne Winegarden, Price Controls Are Not the Answer to Expensive Drugs, FORBES, Oct. 18, 2019
(arguing that price controls over pharmaceutical products may “transform(…) the system of capitalism and free
enterprise into socialism.”); Michael Wornow, Just What the Doctor Ordered: The Case for Drug Price Controls,
HARV. POL. REV ONLINE, Dec. 2, 2018 (surveying arguments against and in favor of pharmaceutical price controls).
15
See e.g., John Abraham, The Pharmaceutical Industry as a Political Player, 360 LANCET 1498 (2002).
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While other markets may share some of these characteristics, it is the combination of all three, in
full force, that makes healthcare markets, and pharmaceutical markets in particular, uniquely
problematic as a way of meeting public health needs.16 In pharmaceutical markets, these features
allow companies to select R&D projects based on the potential for profits rather than public health
impact. Pharmaceutical companies benefit from publicly funded science and a variety of
development subsidies with few strings attached. They control decisions along the product
development and distribution pathway and set prices with the primary goal of maximizing
profits.17 With the use of a variety of exclusivities18 that limit competition and with limits imposed
on government purchasers bargaining power, pharmaceutical companies are able to take advantage
of public and private procurement of their products with little if any need to compete on either
price or health benefit for extended periods of time.19
II. Why the Divergence of Private Incentives and Public Health Widens in Pandemic
Preparedness and Response
This divergence of private incentives from public health needs widens in contexts of pandemic
preparedness and response.
First, forces of supply and demand mediated by price do not work well to respond either to the
possibility of future pandemics or, on an emergency basis, to allocate resources and guide
economic activity once the public health emergency has struck. 20
Even in well working markets, price does a poor job of reflecting the value of being prepared for
unknown future contingencies that will have generalized rather than simply individual impact on
health. The price mechanism does not and cannot capture the difficult-to-quantify and heavily
discounted public health value of being better prepared in the uncertain event that a (corona)virus
or other pathogen of a particular type will spread rapidly within economically profitable markets
at some future time. Pandemic preparedness requires “inefficiencies” from an economic point of
view: carrying excess capacity, stockpiling equipment, and ensuring geographically-spread
production and distribution infrastructure that exceed market demand or for which there will never
be any realized demand.21 It involves investing in the research and development of vaccines and
treatments for pathogens that are likely to never emerge, and for diseases that are most likely to

16

For an in-depth discussion of these three factors in the context of healthcare markets, See Benefit Corp. paper.
While the case study in this Essay focuses on the behavior of a single pharmaceutical company, the phenomena
we identify and describe are transversal to the pharmaceutical industry—or, more precisely, reflects the ingrained
adoption of profit-driven pharmaceutical R&D and commercialization models which are largely at odds with the
pursuit of the public health goals.
18
See e.g., Yaniv Heled, Regulatory Competitive Shelters, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 299 (2015).
19
See e.g., Shawn Tully, The Best Way to Lower Drug Prices: End the Medicaid Program that Blocks Discounts,
FORTUNE, Feb. 5, 2019, https://fortune.com/2019/02/05/the-best-way-to-lower-drug-prices-end-the-medicaidprogram-that-blocks-discounts/ (describing limitations imposed on Medicaid and Medicare Part D’s ability to
negotiate pharmaceutical prices).
20
See Ana Santos Rutschman, IP Preparedness for Outbreak Diseases, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1200 (2018).
For an expanded analysis of this argument in connection with the role of intellectual property as a system of
incentives for innovation, See Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual
Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV (2012).
21
See e.g., David P. Fidler & Lawrence O. Gostin, WHO’s Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework: A
Milestone in Global Governance for Health, 306 JAMA 200 (2011).
17
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remain contained,22 and/or for pathogens that might mutate over time such that approved products
might not work for future infections and outbreaks. Compounding these bleak economic prospects
is the fact that outbreaks of infectious diseases often start with, and remain limited to, neglected
regions and populations, where markets for pharmaceutical products offer limited economic
potential.23 The 2014-2016 transnational Ebola outbreak, which affected primarily countries in
West Africa, is a case in point. Coincidentally (or perhaps not), many of the promising leads on
treatments for COVID-19 are based on advances made—but then stalled—in response to Ebola. 24
Moreover, under current paradigms, pricing of any existing vaccines and drug products before the
start of an outbreak is bound to grossly undervalue the preventative and therapeutic effects of such
products.25
Once an infectious disease that threatens severe health outcomes starts spreading, it is sure to result
in inelastic, and sometimes irrational, maximal market demand for treatments, regardless of
individuals’ risk status and even regardless of product effectiveness. 26 Panic increases the demand
for any potential therapy dramatically, but leaves the ability to pay rather than health need or health
benefit as the determinant of who gets the product in times of shortage. Infectious diseases like
COVID-19 tend to spread more readily and have greater health effects on poorer communities,
where purchasing power, and thus market demand, is low. 27 But when a pandemic emerges,
markets allocate resources based on who can pay the most, which reflects neither individuals’ need
nor the best allocation for achieving public health goals. The tension between ability to pay and
medical need is further compounded by the additional tension between individual demand and the
public interest: while individuals rationally seek to maximize benefits for themselves and their
loved ones, on a population level, herd response is the only method of effectively tackling
pandemics, with herd immunity being the ultimate goal. Leaving the allocation of treatments to be
decided by who can pay for them will inevitably lead to suboptimal results, to everyone’s
detriment. This problem takes on an even greater dimension when we consider the needs of poorer

22

It takes a very particular combination of pathogen characteristics to turn into a successful pandemic, including
non-lethality while contagious, effective spreading mechanisms, non-detectability during incubation, and ability to
avoid effective immune response. See e.g., JOHNS HOPKINS SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH, THE CHARACTERISTICS OF
PANDEMIC PATHOGENS (2018), http://www.centerforhealthsecurity.org/our-work/pubs_archive/pubspdfs/2018/180510-pandemic-pathogens-report.pdf.
23
See e.g., Ben Oppenheim & Gavin Yamey, Pandemics and the Poor, BROOKINGS, Jun. 19, 2017,
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2017/06/19/pandemics-and-the-poor/; Hitoshi Oshitani et al.,
Major Issues and Challenges of Influenza Pandemic Preparedness in Developing Countries, 14 EMERGING
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 875 (2008) (exploring lack of influenza preparedness in the Global South).
24
CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 2014-2016 EBOLA OUTBREAK IN WEST AFRICA (2019),
https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/history/2014-2016-outbreak/index.html.
25
See Ana Santos Rutschman, The Intellectual Property of Vaccines: Takeaways from Recent Infectious Disease
Outbreaks, 118 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 170 (2020).
26
An embodiment of this phenomenon during the COVID-19 pandemic has been the emphasis placed on purported
treatment candidates with scarce to no scientific support for their efficacy or safety. See e.g., United States Food &
Drug Admin., FDA CAUTIONS AGAINST USE OF HYDROXYCHLOROQUINE OR CHLOROQUINE FOR COVID-19
OUTSIDE OF THE HOSPITAL SETTING OR A CLINICAL TRIAL DUE TO RISK OF HEART RHYTHM PROBLEMS (Apr. 30,
2020), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-safety-and-availability/fda-cautions-against-use-hydroxychloroquine-orchloroquine-covid-19-outside-hospital-setting-or.
27
See e.g., Grace A. Noppert, COVID-19 is Hitting Black and Poor Communities the Hardest, Underscoring Fault
Lines in Access and Care for Those on Margins, THE CONVERSATION, Apr. 9, 2020,
https://theconversation.com/covid-19-is-hitting-black-and-poor-communities-the-hardest-underscoring-fault-linesin-access-and-care-for-those-on-margins-135615.
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countries outside of the United States, and the importance of considering not just treatment
effectiveness but also accessibility to large groups of people.
In addition to problems of inelastic demand confronting income constraints and capacity
constraints, the rising price for any type of therapy combined with scarcity of effective treatments
leads to problems of profiteering and attracts products of uncertain quality. During the period of
the outbreak, as information gaps increase and, with them, irrational and even desperate individual
responses, pharmaceutical companies gain the ability to charge high prices for virtually any
purported treatment, regardless of its safety and efficacy profile, and with minimal risk of tort
liability further down the road.28 While emergency conditions also include downward pressures on
prices, which arise, among other things, from emergency government responses such as
compulsory licensing, in the United States these pressures are curbed by the dominant political
belief in the power of the market and the importance of rewarding private innovation. 29 With the
ability to raise prices in a time of crisis, and with limited threat of competition due to limited
capacity, market incentives might even encourage non-preparedness, untimely response, and
profiteering.30
Moreover, although the two are related, it is not product price, but stock price, that drives
pharmaceutical company decisions. Profit-driven entities are primarily driven by stock price,
executive compensation, and short-term profits, which—in the case of pandemics—creates and
exacerbates biases against efforts to prepare for and respond to long-term problems. 31 Long-term
planning, investment in potential therapies with uncertain future applications, carrying excess
capacity for pandemic preparation, and heeding to need-driven allocation of goods required for
pandemic response are unlikely to translate into expectations of short term stock price increases.
Instead, pharmaceutical markets have been increasingly oriented around the ability to reduce risk,
enhance proprietary boundaries, and increase expected short-term revenues from product sales.
Such inherent short-termism makes profit-driven entities particularly poor at responding to the
threat of pandemics. The response once a pandemic threat becomes an actuality is also problematic.
Once emergency strikes, interest in potential therapies drives any company that can even remotely
claim to have a drug or drug candidate to tout its potential and invest in its development. The
immediate impact of the promise of a pandemic drug on the stock price of pharmaceutical
companies is incentive enough to promote poorly substantiated and even just rumored benefits of
purported treatments.32 For those companies with legitimate potential therapies in development,
28

A case in point is the hype surrounding hydroxycholoroquine and its resulting casualties, shortages, and effect on
the stock price of manufacturers. See e.g., Michael Erman and Deena Beasley, Doctors embrace drug touted by
Trump for COVID-19, without hard evidence it works, REUTERS, Apr. 6, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/ushealth-coronavirus-usa-hydroxychloroq/special-report-doctors-embrace-drug-touted-by-trump-for-covid-19without-hard-evidence-it-works-idUSKBN21O2VO.
29
See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
30
See e.g., Mariana Mazzucato & Azzi Momenghalibaf, Drug Companies Will Make a Killing from Coronavirus,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/18/opinion/coronavirus-vaccine-cost.html
31
See e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORG., AN R&D BLUEPRINT FOR ACTION TO PREVENT EPIDEMICS, (2016),
https://www.who.int/blueprint/what/improving-coordination/workstream_5_document_on_financing.pdf?ua=1
(noting a chronic lack of investment in R&D on multiple infectious disease pathogens before an outbreak occurs).
32
See e.g., Jaimy Lee, Mylan to Restart Production of Hydroxychloroquine, MARKETWATCH (Mar. 19, 2020),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/mylan-to-restart-production-of-hydroxychloroquine-2020-03-19 (describing
how shares of pharmaceutical company Mylan increased in value as a response to the company’s announcement that
it would resume manufacturing hydroxychloroquine-sulfate tablets). For discussion of the hype and fallacy of
chloroquine and hydroxycholoroquine as a potential treatment for SARS-CoV-2, see supra note 26.
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impact on stock price is an important factor in managing clinical testing and controlling the release
of results, even when public health would be clearly better served by the rapid disclosure and
sharing of all information, including reports of negative results or information that might support
development of competing therapies. 33
This failure of price to act as a mechanism for directing supply and demand based on public health
value of pandemic preparedness and response plays out well beyond the development of
therapeutic products. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has shed light on similar embodiments of
this problem in other areas that are critical to a quick and effective response to a pandemic,
including the scarcity of hospital beds,34 diagnostic tests35 and ventilators36 in the United States.
Collectively, these examples illustrate the dangers of relying on price as a signal of how to allocate
healthcare R&D efforts and resources in contexts of pandemic preparedness and response, a topic
we explore in greater detail in the case study on remdesivir below.
Second, the United States policy choice to emphasize relying on private incentives to drive
pandemic preparedness and response, and the resulting socialization of the costs (including the
costs of not being prepared) but not the benefits, leaves pharmaceutical companies essentially in
exclusive control of the product target choice, R&D process, and intellectual property where public
input and shared control are most needed. The outspoken reliance on the private sector to provide
pandemic solutions reinforces government efforts to evade accountability for ensuring pandemic
preparedness by shifting responsibility to the private sector, which is beholden to stock-holders,
not the public. In this way the government is able to avoid making the large investments in public
capacity and R&D that government preparedness would require. Limited government funding is
devoted to academic and government research on potential drug candidates for future outbreaks,
but almost always with the idea of handing off early stage ideas to private companies. Government
funding is also provided to private companies for R&D into drugs that might be useful for some
potential future pandemic, but the funding is inadequate and the return on investment for
pharmaceutical companies is too low to attract much of their time or interest. 37
Once a pandemic or large-scale public health crisis occurs - or, more specifically, reaches the
United States, the emergency triggers investment of large sums of government money in initial
R&D and purchasing of treatments.38 Yet, in the United States such initial investment is almost
never accompanied by any measures to secure a reasonable pricing scheme or even just
33

See e.g., Thomas Franck, The Stock Market is Rising on Hope for a Pharma Solution to Coronavirus — Here’s
How Close We Are, CNBC (Apr. 18, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/18/the-stock-market-is-rising-on-hopefor-a-pharma-solution-to-coronavirus-heres-how-close-we-are.html.
34
See e.g., Thomas C. Tsai et al, American Hospital Capacity and Projected Need for COVID-19 Patient Care,
HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200317.457910/full/
35
See e.g., Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, A Federal Report Found Coronavirus Test Shortages at United States
Hospitals. Trump Attacked the Author, TIME MAGAZINE, Apr. 6, 2020, https://time.com/5816134/covid-us-hospitalspatients/
36
See Joshua Resnik, The Ventilator Shortage is Here. The Medication Shortage is Next, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2020,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/09/ventilator-shortage-is-here-medication-shortage-is-next/; H.
C. Huang et al., Stockpiling Ventilators for Influenza Pandemics, 23 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 914 (2017)
(describing insufficient and intermittent investment in ventilators for the Strategic National Stockpile).
37
See e.g. Ekaterina Galkina Cleary, Contribution of NIH Funding to New Drug Approvals 2010–2016, 115
PROCEEDINGS NAT’L ACADEM. SCI., 2329 (2018), https://www.pnas.org/content/115/10/2329
38
See e.g., Rutschman, IP Preparedness, supra note 20 (describing this phenomenon during the 2014-16 Ebola
outbreak).
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consideration of the public investments in R&D. 39 Moreover, the investment of public funds often
takes the form of supporting existing market forces through increased private incentives to speed
discovery and development and subsidize capacity building. This practice is underpinned by a
narrative promoting the need for unfettered private sector innovation, which is portrayed as
incompatible with government efforts to control the price and/or allocation of the R&D outputs. 40
Even in the rare instances in which measures to secure reasonable pricing have been attached to
government investments in early R&D, they have not been implemented. 41
In the midst of the COVID-19 outbreak, the government response to the need for a cure continues
to depend heavily on unfettered private sector innovation, as most recently reflected in the
emergence of “Operation Warp Speed,” a public private partnership formed to identify and speed
the development of promising drug and vaccine candidates for COVID-19 through large scale
government support for private sector programs.42 The heavy reliance that United States
policymakers have placed on private sector innovation to produce therapies and vaccines stands in
stark contrast to international efforts focused on public-private collaborations backed by academic
scientists from around the world and the World Health Organization. 43
Third, the nature and extent of regulation in United States pharmaceutical markets has favored
business models that exploit the availability and use of exclusivities throughout the lifecycle of
product selection, development and sale. The most profitable pharmaceutical business models
focus either on large blockbuster drugs that can be sold at prices high relative to cost and/or niche
market products (such as orphan drugs) where competition is restricted and prices can be kept
high.
The market potential of these exclusivities is limited in the context of developing potential
therapies for pandemic preparedness. Exclusivities have little value for drug that do not (yet) have
a proven existing use, but they do operate to limit the incentives and ability of others to experiment
39

See Rutschman, Vaccine Licensure in the Public Interest, supra note 12 (describing this phenomenon a previous
outbreak of an infectious disease in the United States).
40
See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
41
See Carolyn L. Treasure et al., Do March-In Rights Ensure Access to Medical Products Arising from Federally
Funded Research? A Qualitative Study, 93 MILIBANK Q. 761 (2015).
42
See e.g., Rob Copeland, The Secret Group of Billionaires and Scientists Pushing a Manhattan Project for Covid19, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-secret-group-of-scientists-and-billionairespushing-trump-on-a-covid-19-plan-11587998993; See also Jennifer Jacobs & Drew Armstrong, Trump’s
“Operation Warp Speed” Aims to Rush Coronavirus Vaccine, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Apr. 29, 2020 (project bringing
together private pharmaceutical companies, the United States government and the military to accelerate
development of a vaccine, with taxpayers shouldering much of the cost and risk and with limited liability for
pharmaceutical companies). See also HHS Press Release, Trump Administration Announces Framework and
Leadership for Operation Warp Speed, May 15, 2020 (chief advisor of the initiative is a venture capitalist and
former chairman of a large pharmaceutical company).
43
See e.g., Matt Apuzzo and David Kirkpatrick, Covid-19 Changed How the World Does Science, Together, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 14, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/01/world/europe/coronavirus-science-researchcooperation.html (contrasts the international, collaborative efforts by scientists around the world with the Trump
administration’s focus on United States focused pharmaceutical R&D); Marcus Scholz and N. Craig Smith, In the
Face of a Pandemic, Can Pharma Shift Gears?, MIT SLOAN MANG’T REV., Apr. 16, 2020,
https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/in-the-face-of-a-pandemic-can-pharma-shift-gears/ (contrasting the United States
pharmaceutical model with collaborative initiatives at the international level such as the global trial organized by the
WHO).
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with and utilize un- and under-developed drug candidates. The value of exclusivities in pandemic
drugs and drug-candidates is further compromised when the primary market(s) for such drugs are
in countries where purchasing power is low, and their value can be limited, especially in pandemic
contexts, by temporary government emergency measures such as compulsory licensing. While
pharmaceutical companies may not themselves be interested in developing potential therapies for
pandemics in the absence of information that an outbreak is likely, they may still prefer to exercise
market control over drug-candidates R&D and the capacity to produce such drugs where the area
of R&D overlaps with their existing commercial interests.
The commercial value of exclusivities increases for therapies with potential pandemic application
once the pandemic occurs, but so too does the social cost of these exclusivities. Effective response
to a pandemic requires a commitment to open and rapid sharing of information, including
proprietary information, among potential competitors, and across national and geopolitical lines.44
Yet, the regulatory environment that has allowed for limited pharmaceutical competition outside
the context of a pandemic continues to reward responses to healthcare emergencies with both
intellectual property and market exclusivities administered by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), while allowing stringent data secrecy policies to remain in place. 45 Once a pandemic
strikes, the lure of exclusivities leads to an “arms race” for potential therapeutics and to
development strategies that are designed wherever feasible to safeguard proprietary advantages. If
and when the sharing or transfer of data and intellectual property does occur, it takes place on a
delayed timeline, often only after substantial public and political pressure and concessions. 46
Furthermore, when data and intellectual property sharing arrangements are implemented, they
typically follow the model of strategic licensing, which is designed to limit the capacity of
competitors to compete in particularly lucrative markets. 47 Even where there is a wiliness to engage
in collaborative R&D, the industry lacks well developed mechanisms and practices for
collaborative product development because these mechanisms are so different from normal drug
discovery and development pathways. 48 Efforts at collaboration through public-private
partnerships, such as the Accelerating COVID-19 Therapeutic Interventions and Vaccines
(ACTIV) partnership formed by the National Institutes of Health, other government agencies, and
a group of large pharmaceutical companies to accelerate the development of vaccines and
44

See generally VIRAL SOVEREIGNTY AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: THE CHANGING GLOBAL SYSTEM FOR SHARING
PATHOGENS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH, SAM F. HALABI, ED. (2020).
45
See Heled, Regulatory Competitive Shelters, supra note 18; 21 C.F.R. § 20.61(c) (“Data and information
submitted or divulged to the Food and Drug Administration which fall within the definition of a trade secret or
confidential commercial or financial information are not available for public disclosure.”). See also Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345 (2007).
46
See Rutschman, IP Preparedness, supra note 20, at 1247.
47
See e.g., Ed Silverman, Gilead Deal to Sell Sovaldi in Poor Countries Meets Criticism, PHARMALOT, Sept. 15,
2014, https://blogs.wsj.com/pharmalot/2014/09/15/gilead-deal-to-sell-sovaldi-in-poor-countries-meets-criticism/;
Brook Baker, Gilead Remdesivir Licenses: Half Measures are not Nearly Good Enough, INFOJUSTICE, May 12,
2020, http://infojustice.org/archives/42348. But see GILEAD, VOLUNTARY LICENSING AGREEMENTS FOR
REMDESIVIR, https://www.gilead.com/purpose/advancing-global-health/covid-19/voluntary-licensing-agreementsfor-remdesivir (listing developing countries covered by negotiated by voluntary licensing agreements negotiated by
Gilead and generic manufacturers).
48
See e.g., Marcus Scholz and N. Craig Smith, In the Face of a Pandemic, Can Pharma Shift Gears?, MIT SLOAN
MANAGEMENT REV., Apr. 16, 2020 at https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/in-the-face-of-a-pandemic-can-pharmashift-gears/ (“The pharmaceutical industry’s competition-based model could be a real liability in the race to develop
drugs and vaccines to combat COVID-19”).
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therapeutics in response to COVID-19, fail to depart significantly from existing proprietary R&D
models.49 Instead of an extension of normal practices, open and collaborative late stage
development and distribution requires an entirely different way of operating. Eventually, all of
these market dynamics pit pharmaceutical companies against public health pressures, leading to
adversity and mistrust where collaboration is urgently needed. 50 This is even more true at the global
level, where the national interests of the United States in controlling and receiving priority in
access to effective treatments is in tension with much needed global coordination of efforts, data
sharing, and widespread production.51
III. Illustrating the Divergence: A Case Study of Remdesivir
At the time of writing of this Essay, the story of pharmaceutical company behavior in the midst of
the outbreak continues to evolve, but—at least so far—is evolving along predictable lines, with
responses that mirror behaviors observed in previous public health crises. Although it remains too
early to examine the complete life cycle of any proven treatment for COVID-19, because none has
yet been established, this Essay uses what we know already about remdesivir, currently the most
promising novel treatment for SARS-CoV-2, as a case study to illustrate the limitations of relying
on for-profit pharmaceutical companies for pandemic preparedness and response.
Remdesivir was identified early in the outbreak as one of the most promising candidates for the
treatment of COVID-19 patients.52 It is one among several drugs—mostly targeting HIV infection
and the flu—which scientists have been trying to repurpose for the treatment of COVID-19. 53
Among the hundreds of clinical trials for a possible treatment for COVID-19 underway, 54
remdesivir quickly emerged as one of the leading candidates. 55 By analyzing the life cycle of the
49

See United States NAT’L INSTITUTES HEALTH, NIH TO LAUNCH PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP TO SPEED COVID19 VACCINE AND TREATMENT OPTIONS (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.nih.gov/news-events/news-releases/nih-launchpublic-private-partnership-speed-covid-19-vaccine-treatment-options. See also Jens K. Roehrich et al., Are Public–
private Partnerships a Healthy Option? A Systematic Literature Review, 113 SOCIAL SCI. & MED. (2014),
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0277953614002871.
50
See e.g., Beth Snyder Bulik, United States Trust in Pharma Ticks Upward, but Consumers Still Distrust the
Industry: Survey, FIERCE PHARMA, Apr. 29, 2019, https://www.fiercepharma.com/marketing/trust-pharma-increasesu-s-but-still-resides-distrust-territory-annual-survey.
51
One of the more extreme embodiments of this phenomenon during the COVID-19 pandemic was the
announcement by Sanofi, a large pharmaceutical company, that it would prioritize the United States market in the
commercialization of emerging COVID-19 vaccines. See e.g. France 24, COVID-19: Sanofi Backpedals on US
Vaccine Priority After French Outrage (May 14, 2020), https://www.france24.com/en/20200514-france-saysunacceptable-for-sanofi-to-give-coronavirus-vaccine-to-us-first (further noting that the company quickly abandoned
this strategy following widespread public outcry).
52
See e.g., Tal Axelrod, Experimental COVID-19 Drug Shows Promise in New Study, THE HILL (Apr. 10, 2020),
https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/492322-experimental-covid-19-drug-shows-promise-in-new-study
53
Ned Pagliarulo, A Closer Look at the Ebola Drug that’s Become the Top Hope for a Coronavirus Treatment,
BIOPHARMA DIVE, Mar. 5, 2020, https://www.biopharmadive.com/news/coronavirus-remdesivir-gilead-antiviraldrug-covid-19/573261/.
54
Id., ib.
55
See e.g., Berkeley Lovelace Junior, Scientists Race to Find a Cure or Vaccine for the Coronavirus. Here are the
Top Drugs in Development, CNBC (May 13, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/13/coronavirus-scientists-raceto-find-a-cure-or-vaccine-here-are-the-top-drugs-in-development.html (surveying the leading vaccine and drug
candidates targeting COVID-19); Trefis Team, Gilead Stock Is Up 25% This Year, Time To Sell?, FORBES (May 13,
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discovery and development of remdesivir, both well before and during the early stages of the
pandemic, the case study highlights critical areas in which the private incentives, and consequent
actions, of pharmaceutical companies diverge from public health needs.
A. Gilead’s Development of Remdesivir
Remdesivir was originally developed by Gilead Sciences, a large California-based
biopharmaceutical company with an R&D pipeline that has traditionally included drugs targeting
infectious disease.56 Established in 1987, the company has grown dramatically through a sequence
of strategic acquisitions, acquiring sixteen other biopharmaceutical companies since 1999. One of
the most notable acquisitions was the purchase of Pharmasset, along with its hepatitis C drug,
Sovaldi (Sofosbuvir) in 2011, for a price of $10.4 billion.57 Gilead turned Sovaldi into a highly
priced blockbuster, charging as much as $84,000 per course of treatment. 58 Gilead’s business
strategy has secured its place as a Fortune 500 company with a market cap of approximately $93
billion and annual revenues topping $22 billion in 2018, mostly resulting from its soaring sales of
antiviral drugs.59 The company sustains its revenues through aggressive product pricing, 60 which
is facilitated by patent protection and other exclusivities that limit competition and protect its
dominant market position in its core diseases areas.
While Gilead has attracted more public criticism than most pharmaceutical companies for its
aggressive exploitation of existing market structures to increase profit opportunities on life saving
drugs,61 it has behaved in a way that is consistent with that of other large pharmaceutical companies
202) https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2020/05/13/gilead-stock-is-up-25-this-year-time-tosell/#67e69b6e7f4e.
56
GILEAD SCIENCES, https://www.gilead.com; GILEAD SCIENCES, PIPELINE, https://www.gilead.com/science-andmedicine/pipeline.
57
See e.g., Margaret Visnji, How Gilead Sciences Makes Money? Understanding Gilead Business Model,
REVENUES & PROFITS, Feb. 25, 2019, https://revenuesandprofits.com/how-gilead-sciences-makes-moneyunderstanding-gilead-business-model/.
58
See e.g., Letter from Gregg Alton, Executive Vice President commercial and Access Operations ALA, Corporate
and Medical Affairs, Gilead Sciences, Inc., Re: Betting on Hepatitis C: How financial Speculation in Drug
Development Influences Access to Medicine, 354 BMJ i3718 (2016) (“we stand behind the pricing of our therapies
because of the benefit they bring to patients and the significant value they represent to payers, providers and our
entire healthcare system by reducing the long-term costs associated with managing chronic HCV.”).
59
See e.g., Preston Pyth, The Intrinsic Value of Gilead, FORBES MAG., Jan. 1, 2018,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/prestonpysh/2018/01/01/the-intrinsic-value-of-gilead-science/#2faabbce4b6f
60
See e.g., John LaMattina, Gilead's CEO Admits To 'Failures' In Setting Price of $1,000-A-Pill Breakthrough,
FORBES (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnlamattina/2016/12/08/gileads-ceo-apologetic-aboutsovaldis-1000-per-pill-price-tag/#76411c531a97.
61
Over the last decade, Gilead has been the subject of ongoing criticism for its conduct with relation to some of its
life-saving drugs, primarily Sovaldi. See e.g., Ed Silverman, Lawsuit Alleges Price Gouging by Maker of Hepatitis
Drug, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2014, https://www.wsj.com/articles/lawsuit-alleges-price-gouging-by-maker-ofhepatitis-drug-1418961024. But perhaps the most representative illustration of how ongoing business practices in
non-pandemic scenarios sow the seeds for many of the problems observed during large-scale public health crises is
provided by Gilead’s role in the development and commercialization of HIV drugs. The drug Truvada for preexposure prophylaxis (PrEP) was the first HIV prophylactics to enter the United States market. Nevertheless, even
though Gilead made Truvada available for purchase in 2012, it chose not to promote it as an HIV prevention drug
due to concerns with having its image associated with (a perceived) endorsement of unsafe sexual practices, even
though HIV infection in the United States was back then and is still considered an epidemic. In 2016, however, as
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when faced with similar market opportunities. 62 As further described below, Gilead’s actions can
be understood as natural responses to existing market—particularly stock market—pressures, and
similar patterns of aggressive pricing and anti-competitive product strategies that are prevalent
among other large pharmaceutical companies that together dominate United States pharmaceutical
markets.63 The way in which Gilead has approached the development and commercialization of
remdesivir highlights some of the systemic flaws in the current pharmaceutical R&D ecosystem
that make it unable to adapt effectively in response to potential and actual pandemics.
B. The Development of Remdesivir Before the COVID-19 Pandemic
Remdesivir, originally known as compound GS-5734, emerged from a collaboration between
Gilead, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), and the United States Army Medical Research
Institute of Infectious Disease (USAMRIDD) to identify potential drug candidates for treating
RNA-based viruses with pandemic potential, including members of the coronavirus family. 64 A
precursor to remdesivir was identified by a group of Gilead chemists and CDC scientists involved
in screening a library of potential antiviral compounds to identify those with the ability to fight off
a variety of viruses, one of which was a coronavirus. 65 This precursor to GS-5734 was then refined
and further developed by Gilead scientists working with the USAMRIDD, which tested it against
Truvada became popular among patient communities and was endorsed by the scientific community, Gilead decided
to start promoting it for HIV prevention. At the same time, it increased the price of Truvada for PrEP exponentially.
When Truvada first entered the market in 2004 (with no preventative indications) its price tag was approximately
$650 per month. The year the FDA approved Truvada for PrEP, Gilead raised the price to $1,159 a month. By 2019,
the price had reached $1,750 a month, or $21,100 a year. The latest available data shows that Truvada for PrEP
generated $2.6 billion in 2019 in the United States alone. To this day, Truvada’s price tag for PrEP is considered one
of the primary causes for non-compliance among patients and individuals in high risk groups. For an expanded case
study of Gilead’s development and commercialization of Truvada, see generally Ana Santos Rutschman,
Reconfiguring the Relationship Between International Intellectual Property and Public Health, 53 VAND. J.
TRANSNA’L L. __ (forthcoming 2021). See also NBC NEWS, Switching Course, Gilead Markets HIV Drug for
Prevention (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/switching-course-gilead-markets-hiv-drugprevention-n690271; Jason Rhode, PrEP Drug Priced Out of Most People’s Reach, GEORGIA VOICE (Jul. 13, 2018),
https://thegavoice.com/news/national/prep-drug-priced-out-of-most-peoples-reach/.
62
See e.g., Marcus Scholz and N. Craig Smith, In the Face of a Pandemic, Can Pharma Shift Gears?, MIT SLOAN
MANAGEMENT REV., Apr. 16, 2020 at https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/in-the-face-of-a-pandemic-can-pharmashift-gears/ (“The pricing behavior of pharma companies isn’t surprising, given how the industry operates and how
individual players compete.”); Mike Leonard, Sanofi, Novo Nordisk, Eli Lilly Must Face Insulin Price Suit,
BLOOMBERG LAW (Feb. 20, 2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/mergers-and-antitrust/sanofi-novo-nordisk-elililly-must-face-insulin-rico-claims.
63
See e.g., Nicholas Florko and Damian Garde, With Remdesivir, Gilead Finds Itself at Strategic Crossroads, with
its Reputation (and Far More) at Stake, May 5, 2020, https://www.statnews.com/2020/05/05/remdesivir-gileadstrategic-crossroads-reputation-far-more-at-stake/?utm_source=STATNewsletters&utm_campaign=927e2ef446Pharmalot&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_8cab1d7961-927e2ef446-150798609.
64
See e.g., R. Eastmen et al., Remdesivir: A Review of its Discovery and Development Leading to Emergency Use
Authorization for Treatment of COVID-19, ACS CENT. SCI. 2020, May 4, 2020 at
https://pubs.acs.org/doi/pdf/10.1021/acscentsci.0c00489 (discussing the discovery and development history of
remdesivir).
65
Gilead Sciences, Inc., Development of Remdesivir, https://www.gilead.com/-/media/gileadcorporate/files/pdfs/covid-19/gilead_rdv-development-fact-sheet-2020.pdf. See also Kathryn Ardizzone, Role of the
Federal Government in the Development of Remdesivir, KEI BRIEFING, NOTE 2020.1, 1 at
https://www.keionline.org/wp-content/uploads/KEI-Briefing-Note-2020_1GS-5734-Remdesivir.pdf; Andrew
Joseph, As the Coronavirus Spreads, a Drug that Once Raised the World’s Hopes is Given a Second Shot, STAT,
Mar. 16, 2020 at https://www.statnews.com/2020/03/16/remdesivir-surges-ahead-against-coronavirus/.
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several pathogens, including the Ebola virus, using animal models in a government laboratory. 66
The results of this study led to a series of government funded collaborations between Gilead and
a group of academic medical centers to test the effectiveness of GS-5743 against two other
coronaviruses that cause the dangerous Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Middle
East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS).67
Since the SARS outbreak in the early 2000s, it is estimated that the NIH has spent nearly $700
million on R&D efforts targeting coronaviruses. 68 As part of these efforts, the research that led to
the development of remdesivir was funded by a $37.5 million NIH grant awarded to a publicprivate partnership between several academic laboratories in the United States and Gilead. 69
USAMRIID and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, as well as the Medical Countermeasure
Systems Joint Project Management Office in the United States Department of Defense, also
contributed to research involving remdesivir.70 Remdesivir’s mechanism of action was specifically
studied in coronaviruses in academic laboratories in the United States, again with NIH funding. 71
From this body of largely government funded research it became clear that remdesivir offered
promise as a therapeutic agent for coronaviruses that might have the potential to cause pandemics.
Gilead’s response to promising pre-clinical results was to seek patent protection for remdesivir
and, once a potential market for the drug emerged, to pursue additional market protections. In
2008, Gilead filed the first provisional applications covering remdesivir and other structurally
related compounds.72 In 2014 Gilead filed the first of another set of patent applications covering
remdesivir and other structurally related compounds as well as methods for using these compounds
for the treatment of Ebola and other viruses. 73 By 2015, remdesivir was already identified as a
66

See Ardizzone supra note 65.
Id., ib.
68
See Public Citizen, The Real Story of Remdesivir, https://www.citizen.org/article/the-real-story-of-remdesivir/;
Christopher Rowland, The Best Hope for Coronavirus Treatment is an Experimental Drug that Fizzled Against
Ebola, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/the-best-hope-forcoronavirus-treatment-is-an-experimental-drug-that-fizzled-against-ebola/2020/03/10/8a9e8cd4-5fe8-11ea-b29b9db42f7803a7_story.html.
69
Savannah Koplon, Investigational Compound Remdesivir, Developed by UAB And NIH Researchers, Being Used
for Treatment of Novel Coronavirus, UAB NEWS, Feb. 7, 2020, https://www.uab.edu/news/health/item/11082investigational-compound-remdesivir-developed-by-uab-and-nih-researchers-being-used-for-treatment-of-novelcoronavirus.
70
See Ardizzone supra note 65. The involvement of the public sector in early stages of remdesivir R&D taps into
broader debates about the privatization of government-supported research and its specific consequences for
consumers/patients in the biopharmaceutical arena. For a general treatment of this problem, see Rebecca E. Wolitz,
The Pay-Twice Critique, Government Funding, and Reasonable Pricing Clauses, 39 J. LEG. MED. 177 (2019).
71
Maria L. Agostini et al. Coronavirus Susceptibility to the Antiviral Remdesivir (GS-5734) is Mediated by the Viral
Polymerase and the Proofreading Exoribonuclease, 9 MBIO. E00221-18 (2018).
72
See United States Provisional Patent Application Nos. 61/047,263, filed Apr. 23, 2008 and 61/139,449, filed Dec.
19, 2008. These two applications and their continuations resulted in a several patents that appear to claim
remdesivir. See Claim 15 of United States Patent No. 8,008,264; Claim 15 of United States Patent No. 8,318,682;
and Claim 21 of United States Patent No. RE46,762 (which is a reissue of United States Patent No. 8,318,682).
Notably, these claims may be deficient due to improper dependency from Claim 1 of each of these patents,
respectively. The ‘264 patent—apparently the patent with the longest in the portfolio—will expire on November 6,
2029.
73
See United States Provisional Patent Application No. 62/072,331, filed Oct. 29, 2014, which led to the filing of
non-provisional United States Patent Application No. 14/926,062, filed Oct. 29, 2015, which issued as United States
67
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potential therapeutic for Ebola and a broad spectrum of other viral infections, including SARS and
MERS.74 At that point, the amenability of remdesivir to large-scale manufacturing was apparent,
making it even more attractive as a possible treatment for future coronavirus outbreaks. 75
Although by 2018 remdesivir’s potential against dangerous respiratory diseases was clear, and its
mechanism of action against coronaviruses was well understood, 76 Gilead chose to focus its
relatively limited R&D efforts for remdesivir only on Ebola and Marburg diseases. When
remdesivir failed to show clinical benefit in humans as a treatment for Ebola, further development
efforts were quickly abandoned, although Gilead continued to hold on to intellectual property
rights covering the drug.77
There is no indication that Gilead consulted with any of its public partners and collaborators when
deciding whether to cease R&D efforts for remdesivir. There is also no indication that Gilead’s
decision in August 2019 to abandon development efforts on remdesivir entirely was made with
any consideration of the significant public investment that went into its development or with any
consideration of the potential public health value of the drug as part of pandemic preparedness.
Similarly, as we discuss in further detail below, the public investment in remdesivir has had no
visible or acknowledged role in Gilead’s decision of how to price the drug once it was approved
as therapy for SARS-CoV-2.78
Given Gilead’s focus on the price that people might one day pay for remdesivir, and expected
profits, adjusted for risk, the decision to pursue a narrow R&D path focused on the potential to
address an outbreak of Ebola, which for a short time had threatened to impact the United States
and other markets with commercial potential, was a rational one. So too was its decision to stop
development when it became clear that remdesivir would not be an effective treatment for Ebola.
While the public health benefits of further development of this compound were significant, even
once it was determined that the drug would not be useful for the Ebola outbreak, these benefits did
not translate into expectations of large product revenues or the potential for stock price
appreciation. With SARS and MERS geographically limited and contained outside the United

Patent No. 9,724,360, on Aug. 8, 2017. The patent portfolio protecting remdesivir also includes the corresponding
International Patent Application WO2016/069,825, filed Oct. 29, 2015; United States Patent Nos. 9,949,994 and
10,251,898, issued Apr. 24, 2018 and Apr. 9, 2019, respectively, both entitled “Methods for treating Filoviridae
virus infections”; and United States Patent Application No. 14/926,063, entitled “Methods for the preparation of
ribosides,” for which a notice of allowance was issued on Mar. 18, 2020.
74
Travis K. Warren et al., Therapeutic Efficacy of the Small Molecule GS-5734 Against Ebola Virus in Rhesus
Monkeys, 531 NATURE 381 (2016); Timothy P. Sheahan et al., Broad-Spectrum Antiviral GS-5734 Inhibits both
Epidemic and Zoonotic Coronaviruses, 9 SCI. TRANS. MED. eaal3553 (2017).
75
Id., ib.
76
See Agostini supra note 71.
77
See e.g., Sabue Mulangu et al., A Randomized, Controlled Trial of Ebola Virus Disease Therapeutics, 301 N.
ENGL. J. MED. 2293 (2019).
78
As of the time of writing this article, in early May 2020, remdesivir is still undergoing clinical evaluation although
there are some signs that it may have significant clinical benefits in the treatment of SARS-CoV-2 infections. See
FDA, Coronavirus (COVID-19) Update: FDA Issues Emergency Use Authorization for Potential COVID-19
Treatment, FDA News Release (May 1, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/coronaviruscovid-19-update-fda-issues-emergency-use-authorization-potential-covid-19-treatment.
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States,79 there were not sufficient financial incentives (public or private) to pursue remdesivir as a
potential generalized treatment of coronavirus infections. 80 While it remained possible that a new
SARS and MERS-like coronavirus might emerge as a global health threat, the expected
commercial benefits of investing in further development remained too low to attract further effort
by Gilead. In other words, Gilead’s decision to only pursue remdesivir for treatment of Ebola and
Marburg diseases, and to abandon development when it proved ineffective for Ebola, was a logical
response to the market incentives that it faced prior to the outbreak of SARS-CoV-2.
By January 2020, when it became apparent that the global spread of SARS-CoV-2 was inevitable,
it was already too late to put remdesivir through the testing that would have been necessary to
know in advance whether it would provide an effective treatment for this particular coronavirus.
It was also too late to have the capacity ready to manufacture large volumes of remdesivir in the
event it did provide an effective treatment. As discussed above, price and profits do not adequately
capture the value of pandemic preparedness. When R&D decisions are made based primarily on
financial projections, drugs that might have significant value in a pandemic do not get adequately
developed in advance, and excess capacity does not get built based on possibilities of future need.
In addition to showing the dangers of relying on expected price and expected profits to direct R&D
flows, the early R&D of remdesivir also shows the limitations of the paradigm of innovation
central to United States healthcare markets, with public sector support for research and
development and private sector control of the resulting developments. 81 The story of remdesivir’s
development, and lack of development, reveals a socialization of costs and privatization of benefits
in ways that do not lend themselves to adequate pandemic preparedness. The development path of
remdesivir was a circuitous one, involving collaborations with academic medical centers and
support from government labs pushed along by a combination of federal funding and investment
by Gilead, but with a limited scope and a truncated development that failed to reflect its pandemic
potential.82 While development efforts were fueled by federal funding and research support, the
R&D path and its eventual termination was controlled by Gilead. The continued control that Gilead
exerted over remdesivir through its intellectual property rights even when R&D efforts were
abandoned further limited opportunities for others to explore the pandemic potential of the drug.
79

The last case of SARS was in 2004 and MERS in 2014. See AM. LUNG ASS’N, Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome (SARS), https://www.lung.org/lung-health-diseases/lung-disease-lookup/severe-acute-respiratorysyndrome-sars; CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, MERS in the United States,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/mers/us.html.
80
We note that this is a failure of government, not profit-driven entities (which are not currently designed to pursue
unprofitable goals) inasmuch as it pertains to the lack of adequate financial support for the development of vaccines
and drugs like remdesivir for potential health threats before the emergence of the diseases they are meant to
prevent/treat.
81
See The Real Story of Remdesivir supra note 68 (estimating public support of remdesivir R&D at over $70M);
USAMRIID Press Release, Antiviral Compound Provides Full Protection from Ebola Virus in Nonhuman Primates,
Oct. 9, 2015,
https://web.archive.org/web/20161224000431/http://www.usamriid.army.mil/press_releases/Travis%20ID%20Week
%20FINAL.pdf. See also Development of Remdesivir supra note 65.
82
See also Andrew Joseph, As the Coronavirus Spreads, a Drug that Once Raised the World’s Hopes is Given a
Second Shot, STAT, Mar. 16, 2020 at https://www.statnews.com/2020/03/16/remdesivir-surges-ahead-againstcoronavirus/ (“Born as a general antiviral candidate, researchers threw it at an array of viruses and saw where it
stuck. It bounced along from Gilead’s labs to academic centers, nudged by both federal taxpayer dollars and support
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Finally, Gilead’s exclusive intellectual property rights over remdesivir 83 allowed Gilead to control
the evolution of the remdesivir R&D efforts. While the market value of these exclusivities might
have seemed limited in the pre-pandemic world, Gilead nevertheless retained exclusive control
over the potential drug even after abandoning R&D efforts. With these market exclusivities in
place, none of Gilead’s public partners and collaborators would reasonably consider further R&D
efforts to explore the pandemic potential of the drug without Gilead’s express permission and
involvement.
C. Remdesivir and Gilead’s Response to COVID-19
Subsequent to the emergence of COVID-19 and identification of SARS-CoV-2 as its cause,
remdesivir was evaluated by the Centers for Disease Control alongside several other potential
antiviral agents and “rediscovered” as a lead compound against this novel coronavirus. 84 In
January 2020, a WHO panel pronounced remdesivir as the most promising therapeutic candidate
against the new virus.85 Remdesivir was subsequently administered to the first patient to have been
diagnosed in the United States and was at that time held to be the best hope in the fight against
COVID-19.86
While the value of pandemic preparedness is not adequately captured by market price, or even
expected future price, once a pandemic strikes the market value of any potential therapeutic takes
a radical jump upwards, as does the stock price of the company that owns it. In contrast to the
value of pandemic preparedness, which does not translate into expectations of future revenue or
stock market value, even the faintest promise of being able to provide a treatment in the wake of
the outbreak results in a large stock price increase as investors anticipate future profit
opportunities. This fuels the efforts of pharmaceutical companies to accelerate R&D of sometimes
long abandoned potential drug candidates. Gilead’s rediscovery of remdesivir, and the associated
hike in Gilead’s stock price, has been no exception.87 The potential future revenue opportunities
of remdesivir, translated immediately into higher stock prices, have propelled Gilead into
accelerated clinical testing of its once abandoned therapeutic. The potential promise of remdesivir,
which has been undergoing extensive testing since February 2020 in six separate clinical trials
around the world,88 has translated into a rise in Gilead’s stock price from $63 in November 2019
to near $80 in early April 2020, a 26 percent increase.89 This stock price hike has occurred even as
83
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the United States and global stock markets and world economy are plummeting. 90 In response to
early questions about what the future price of remdesivir might be, Gilead was non-comital,
recognizing the need to navigate conflicting pressures from its investors to take actions, such as
pricing, that continue to fuel stock price growth, and pressures from public and government
pressures to keep the prices affordable.
The federal government response to remdesivir has been consistent with its policy approach
towards biomedical innovation more generally—relying on a strategy of subsidizing and
rewarding private sector innovation as the best way to meet the emergency need for an effective
treatment for COVID-19. Despite the significant public funding that went into the development of
remdesivir, the federal government has been reluctant to intervene in Gilead’s decision-making
regarding the development, manufacture, and future pricing of the drug. In the face of public
pressure from a variety of public interest groups to make production and pricing decisions that
ensure open access and accessibility, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
(PhRMA) organization, the pharmaceutical industry’s trade association and lobbying
powerhouse—of which Gilead is a member—along with Gilead, have found powerful allies from
within the public sector in their efforts to shake off attempts to interfere with corporate control
over drug development and pricing.91 When asked whether the administration intended to
guarantee that treatments or vaccines for SARS-CoV-2 would be affordable, the Secretary of
Health and Human Services, Alex Azar, refused to provide such guarantee, citing concerns that
imposing pricing restrictions would dampen investment in developing such treatments in the first
place.92 Similarly, “Operation Warp Speed” references the possibility of some corporate donations
of resulting drugs, but does not mention any public control over manufacturing or pricing
decisions.
To be sure, this seeming identity of interests and rhetoric between the industry and policymaker
and regulators is nothing new and reflects ideological acquiescence to market mechanisms as much
as it shows the level of regulatory capture of such policymakers and regulators by the industry.
Notably, the reluctance to exercise government control in the COVID-19 crisis is consistent with
the federal government approach in prior public health emergencies. During the 2015-16 Zika
outbreak, for example, the government ignored requests that Zika vaccines resulting from
outbreak-induced R&D be priced affordably.93 Once again, the socialization of costs but
privatization of benefits leaves the private sector—in this case Gilead—in control of the
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manufacture and pricing of a therapy largely developed through government funding and support,
even in the midst of a pandemic, raising concerns about future pricing and access to the drug.
Finally, while in the context of pandemic preparedness the role, and market value, of exclusive
controls over a potential pandemic drug may be limited, the value and importance of exclusive
rights escalate in the midst of a pandemic. Although Gilead’s use of intellectual property and
market exclusivities to control the research and manufacturing of remdesivir likely limited the
scope of and participation in early research on the drug, the potential public health costs of these
exclusivities become more salient in contexts of pandemic response.
At the start of the outbreak, with no prior incentives to invest in a remdesivir stockpile,
manufacturing capacity, or a distribution network, an immediate shortage of the drug was
inevitable as the SARS-CoV-2 quickly spread throughout the United States and globally. Since
Gilead controls both the manufacture and the sale of remdesivir through its intellectual property
rights, it controls the ability of other companies to respond to the shortage. After providing
remdesivir to several hundred patients on a case-by-case basis for “compassionate use,” in March
2020 Gilead announced that it was shutting down its emergency access program for the drug. 94 In
a separate statement by Gilead’s CEO in early April, the company said it had about 1.5 million
doses of remdesivir, enough for only 140,000 treatments. 95 The CEO touted Gilead’s efforts to
“rapidly expand production and increase supply” and announced that “we have set an ambitious
goal of producing more than 500,000 treatment courses by October and more than 1 million
treatment courses by the end of [2020].” 96 Should the drug receive approval as a treatment for
SARS-CoV-2, one million treatment courses by the end of 2020 would not even begin to satisfy
the public health needs of the United States, let alone the world.
Gilead’s efforts to maintain control over access to remdesivir took an even more explicit form in
its pursuit, once the outbreak began, of orphan drug exclusivity on the drug. Gilead’s original
patent applications on remdesivir, other related compounds, and methods of using these
compounds were filed as early as April 2008 and at least some of the resulting patents are expected
to remain in force through 2035.97 In early march 2020—taking advantage of the fact that at that
point there were still fewer than 200,000 confirmed cases of COVID-19 in the United States—
Gilead also filed a request with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to have remdesivir
approved as an “orphan drug” for treatment of SARS-CoV-2.98 In so doing, the company sought
to augment its control over the remdesivir market by supplementing its patents with a litigation94
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proof orphan drug exclusivity lasting through 202799 as well as to secure significant tax benefits
that come with an orphan drug designation.100 On March 23, 2020, the FDA approved Gilead’s
request to designate remdesivir as an orphan drug.101 Gilead’s original request for orphan drug
designation made sense from a financial perspective and is in line with Gilead’s (and virtually all
other pharmaceutical companies) business model, but lay in direct conflict with the public health
need for widespread and affordable access to pharmaceutical products during a pandemic. The
public announcement of this approval resulted in a public outcry, which no doubt influenced
Gilead’s unprecedented request that the FDA rescind remdesivir’s orphan drug designation. 102
At the time of writing of this Essay, although remdesivir has already received emergency
authorization to serve as treatment for coronavirus patients, 103 the drug is still undergoing
evaluation in clinical trials and has yet to receive final FDA approval for marketing in the United
States. PhRMA, on behalf of Gilead and other pharmaceutical companies, has opposed proposals
to include provisions addressing pricing issues in a $8.3 billion coronavirus spending bill 104 and
its lobbyists successfully blocked a proposal that would have threatened intellectual property rights
for drugs priced unfairly.105 In addition to eliminating provisions dealing with intellectual property
issues, PhRMA further succeeded in introducing language preventing the government from
intervening even if there are concerns about the affordability of drugs under development. 106
Public interest advocates argue that since the R&D on remdesivir was supported in significant
ways by public actors and funds, and taking reasonable estimates of the costs of manufacturing the
drug into account, remdesivir could be priced at relatively low prices, ranging $1-29 per course of
treatment, while still being profitable.107 They also argue that the U.S. government co-invested in
and co-owns patents on the drug, giving it still more reason, and ability, to intervene in pricing and
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manufacturing decisions for the drug. 108 Yet, Gilead has thus far resisted attempts to commit to
pricing the drug affordably for indicated populations. 109 In late June 2020, the company announced
that a five-day course (the shortest course) of treatment would cost $3,120 to Medicaid, Medicare
and private insurers in the United States, and $2,340 to the Department of Veterans Affairs and
the Indian Health Service, a division within the Department of Health and Human Services. 110
Gilead also announced that remdesivir would be commercialized at a 25% discounted price in
developed market outside the United States, and at an unspecified, “substantially lower” price
throughout the developing world.111 The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
announced that it has already purchased 500,000 courses of the drug for use in U.S. hospitals,
representing all of the doses that Gilead expects to produce in July and almost all of the doses it
expects to produce in August and September.112 In addition to its pricing decisions, Gilead has
come under public scrutiny for entering into confidential licensing agreements that would prevent
generic versions of the drug from being distributed in countries that account for nearly half of the
world’s population.113
As described above, Gilead’s conduct in the early R&D of remdesivir—perfectly logical from a
financial standpoint and in-line with corporate norms—illustrates how profit-driven responses
have delayed remdesivir R&D until it was too late to meet public health needs. Gilead’s subsequent
actions to control the development, manufacturing and pricing decisions of remdesivir in the wake
of the outbreak, illustrate how profit-driven responses to pandemics may lead to siloed R&D, the
potential for significant (and tragic) shortages, and/or potentially unaffordable pricing, of
pandemic drugs.
IV. Conclusion
The divergence of private incentives from public health needs has contributed to profound failures
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in preparedness and response to the COVID-19 pandemic. 114 The consequences of relying on
profit-driven entities for pandemic preparedness and response are playing out in real time, as
companies that are inadequately prepared search their existing portfolios for any candidates that
may be used in the treatment of COVID-19 with an eye on stock price, government emergency
funds, and the lure of lucrative pricing for any resulting treatments. United States federal
government policy, which has for many decades focused largely on encouraging the private sector
to meet public health needs is—not surprisingly—now focused on providing additional incentives
to bring potential treatments, tests, and much needed equipment to the market as rapidly as
possible, with few strings attached. Commentators have suggested a variety of different ways of
supporting such efforts during the current pandemic including proposals for rewarding vaccine
and drug discovery in new ways, utilizing the Defense Production Act, compulsory licensing, and
more.115 All of these proposals are, ultimately, aimed at addressing the divergence of private
incentives from public health needs on an emergency basis. Most rely simply on increasing private
incentives to meet the current emergency need for vaccines and therapies. We suggest that these
approaches share a failure to acknowledge and confront the structural problem with relying on the
profit-driven model in general, and the way it is driving pharmaceutical innovation in particular,
to satisfy public health needs, particularly in a pandemic.
While we agree that private-sector innovation is essential, and that pharmaceutical companies play
an indispensable role in bringing treatments to market, this Essay highlights the public health costs
of relying on our current exclusively profit-driven markets for pandemic preparation and response.
At this moment, we find ourselves in the midst of frantic emergency efforts to patch up the effects
of the many decades in which private incentives were allowed to diverge from public health
interests. Rather than doing more of the same, public health will be best served, particularly in a
pandemic-prone world, by changing incentive structures in healthcare markets to bring private
incentives more closely in line with the health outcomes that are critically needed. 116
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